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The Evolving Approach to  
Section 15(1): Diminished Rights or 
Bolder Communities? 
Roslyn J. Levine, Q.C. and Jonathon W. Penney* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Inevitably, cases of complex and far-reaching constitutional issues 
form a dynamic platform on which earlier conflicts within the case law 
are resolved and new ones develop.1 One concern that refuses resolu-
tion, to this point, is the precise balance between the values and interests 
that define the right to equality under section 15 of the Charter2 and 
those that characterize justification, under section 1.3 The issue has 
                                                                                                                                
*
  Counsel with the Department of Justice (Canada) in the Ontario Regional Office. The 
views expressed in this paper are solely those of the authors and not the Department of Justice or 
the Attorney General of Canada. 
1
  See, e.g., the often cited disagreement among members of the Court as to the role “irrel-
evant personal characteristic” should play in determining whether a law is discriminatory in An-
drews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] S.C.J. No. 6, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143; Egan v. 
Canada, [1995] S.C.J. No. 43, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 [hereinafter “Egan”]; Thibaudeau v. Canada 
(Minister of National Revenue), [1995] S.C.J. No. 42, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 627, 124 D.L.R. (4th) 449, 
and Miron v. Trudel, [1995] S.C.J. No. 44, [1995]2 S.C.R. 418, was eventually resolved by the 
Court’s unanimous decision in Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 
S.C.J. No. 12, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 [hereinafter “Law”]. In addition, the Court in Law continued its 
emphasis on enumerated and analogous grounds despite L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s advocacy in Egan for 
an approach that focused less on the grounds and more on the discrimination itself. Some, like 
Professor Pothier, agreed with the Court on its chosen direction. See Dianne Pothier, “Connecting 
Grounds of Discrimination to Real People’s Real Experiences” (2001) 13 C.J.W.L. 37, at 49. In 
recent years, however, others have argued that L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s approach is appropriate in 
certain circumstances: see Daphne Gilbert, “Time to Regroup: Rethinking Section 15 of the Char-
ter” (2003) 48 McGill L.J. 627; Jonathon Penney, “A Constitution for the Disabled or a Disabled 
Constitution? Toward a New Approach to Disability for the Purposes of s. 15(1)” (2002) 1 J.L. & 
Equality 83.  
2
  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].  
3
  See e.g., the disagreements between the judgments of Gonthier, L’Heureux-Dubé and 
McLachlin JJ. in Miron, in particular the comments of McLachlin J., at 486. See also the disagree-
ments among members of the Court in Lavoie v. Canada, [2002] S.C.J. No. 24, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 769 
[hereinafter “Lavoie”], wherein Bastarache J., for the plurality, rejected the consideration of  
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foiled legal commentators and the Supreme Court of Canada alike. In 
2004, the Supreme Court’s calendar included a number of high profile 
section 15 challenges.4 In this article, we suggest that in the past year, 
the Court embarked on a changed approach to the values and interests 
embodied in section 15; it took a direction that demonstrates greater 
recognition of community interests and a corresponding movement 
away from past emphasis of individualistic and subjective concerns. 
The year’s cases addressed a broad variety of claims that attempted 
to engage the equality right in a wide variety of circumstances. Remark-
ably, none of the challenges was successful. More surprisingly, in three 
of four cases the Court determined that section 15 was not violated and 
dismissed the claims without resort to section 1.  
In Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Cana-
da (Attorney General)5 the children’s advocacy organization asked the 
Court to find that the section 43 defence in the Criminal Code violated 
children’s equality rights. The provision exempts parents from the as-
sault sections of the Code if they use reasonable disciplinary force, such 
as “spanking,” when correcting their children. Auton v. British Colum-
bia6 tested the claim by autistic children that the Health Act (B.C.) 
breached their equality rights by failing to include coverage for special 
therapy that did not meet the definition of medical services. Section 15 
was not violated in these circumstances. 
                                                                                                                                
“practical, moral, economic, or social underpinnings of the legislation in question” within the s. 
15(1) analysis. In terms of academic debate on the ss. 15(1) and 1 balance, see e.g., Jim Hendry, 
“The Idea of Equality in Section 15 and Its Development” (2002) 21 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 
153; Sheilah Martin, “Balancing Individual Rights to Equality and Social Goals” (2001) 80 Can. 
Bar Rev. 299, at 319-32; June Ross, “A Flawed Synthesis of the Law” (2000) 11 Const. F. Const. 
74; Christopher Bredt & Ira Nishisato, “The Supreme Court’s New Equality Test: A Critique” 
(September-October 2000) 8 Can. Watch 16 [hereinafter “Nishisato”]; Peter W. Hogg, Constitu-
tional Law of Canada (Stud. ed. 2001), at 1007-15; Leon E. Trakman, William Cole-Hamilton & 
Sean Gatien, “R. v. Oakes 1986-1997: Back to the Drawing Board” (1998) 36 Osgoode Hall L.J. 
83; Bev Baines, “Law v. Canada: Formatting Equality” (2000) 11 Const. F. Const. 65. 
4 
 See e.g., Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. Newfoundland and Labrador Assn. of Pub-
lic and Private Employees (N.A.P.E.), [2004] S.C.J. No. 61, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 381, 244 D.L.R. (4th) 
294 [hereinafter “NAPE”]; Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada 
(Attorney General), [2004] S.C.J. No. 6, [2004]1 S.C.R. 76 [hereinafter “Canadian Foundation”]; 
Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] S.C.J. No. 75, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698 [hereinafter “Same Sex 
Marriage Reference”]; Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 
[2004] S.C.J. No. 71, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 657, 245 D.L.R. (4th) 1 [hereinafter “Auton”]; Hodge v. 
Canada (Minister of Human Resources Development), [2004] S.C.J. No. 60, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 357, 
244 D.L.R. (4th) 257 [hereinafter “Hodge”]. 
5
  Supra, note 4. 
6
  Supra, note 4, citing R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 179. 
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The case of Hodge v. Canada7 concerned a separated common law 
spouse’s challenge to her differential treatment under the Canada Pen-
sion Plan, which denied her a survivor’s pension, but provided it to 
married but separated spouses. Once again, no section 15 violation was 
found. In Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. Newfoundland and Labra-
dor Assn. of Public and Private Employees8 the Court examined the 
claim of women workers whose previously hard fought “pay equity” 
payments were cancelled by legislation aimed at fiscal restraint. Here, 
the Court departed significantly from previous cases that had completely 
rejected economic justification. Although section 15 was violated, the 
legislation was upheld. 
Lastly in the Same Sex Marriage Reference,9 the Court assessed the 
constitutionality of the proposed same-sex marriage legislation but re-
fused to answer the pointed equality question referred to it by the federal 
government, that is, whether the traditional, opposite-sex definition of 
marriage violates the section 15 rights of gay and lesbian couples. 
In each of these decisions, the Court exhibited ideas about equality 
that illustrate a shift away from its previous, more individualistic, ap-
proach to the values and interests in section 15. The “community” has 
always resided in section 1, where violations of the individual’s rights 
were justified by communitarian standards. This year, however, the 
Court has taken a more communitarian approach to section 15. 
In Part II of this paper, we discuss the major themes of “communi-
tarian”10 social theory and the work of prominent legal commentators 
and jurists who have advocated this ethic and criticized the Supreme 
Court of Canada’s section 15 approach as individualistic and subjective. 
In Parts III to VI, we suggest that the Court’s most recent equality rights 
decisions give effect, in various ways, to communitarian themes. Final-
ly, in Part VII we assess the Court’s move toward a more communitari-
an approach, including its advantages and shortcomings. 
                                                                                                                                
7
  Supra, note 4. 
8
  Supra, note 4. 
9
  Supra, note 4. 
10  Phillip Selznick, “The Idea of a Communitarian Morality” (1987) 75 Calif. L. Rev. 445, 
at 445-47. See Part II for a more authoritative discussion of communitarian theory.  
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II. SECTION 15 AND COMMUNITARIAN THOUGHT 
1.  Modern Communitarian Thought and Canadian 
Constitutionalism 
Heavily influenced by modern sociology, communitarian thought 
has emerged in the last 20 years to challenge traditional and contempo-
rary theories of liberalism advocated by John Rawls, Robert Nozick and 
Ronald Dworkin — the school of thought that has dominated recent 
political theory.11 Though differences exist among the various theorists 
most often associated with communitarian thought — Charles Taylor, 
Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Sandel and Michael Walzer12 — some 
common themes are identifiable throughout. First, communitarians 
criticize the overly subjective and individualistic understanding of the 
person in traditional liberal theory.13 According to communitarians, 
traditional liberal theory places importance primarily on personal liberty 
and equality and perceives the individual as existing prior to his or her 
social relationships and community.14 As MacIntyre writes, liberal the-
ory requires us to “abstract ourselves from all those particularities of 
social relationships of which we have been accustomed to understand 
our responsibilities and our interests.”15 For communitarians, this heav-
ily subjective account of the “self” fails to recognize that people do not 
exist in isolation, but live and grow in social relationships and commu-
nities: 
What is denied to [liberal theory’s] unencumbered self is the 
possibility of membership in any community bound by moral ties 
                                                                                                                                
11  Id., at 445-7. Writers Charles Taylor, Alisdair MacIntyre, Michael Sandel and Michael 
Walzer are most often cited as “communitarian” theorists. See Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the 
Limits of Justice (2nd ed. 1998); Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (2nd ed. 1984); Charles Taylor, 
“Cross-Purposes: The Liberalism-Communitarian Debate” in Rosenblum (ed.), Liberalism and the 
Moral Life (1989); Charles Taylor, Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Phil. Papers, Vol. 2 
(1985); Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice (New York: Basic Books, 1983). The political theories 
challenged by the communitarians were the traditional liberal theories, and their many permuta-
tions, as articulated by John Stuart Mill, John Rawls and Robert Nozick. See John Rawls, A Theory 
of Justice (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971); Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, 
and Utopia (Basic Books, 1974); John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, Himmelfarb, (ed.) (Knopf, 1974).  
12  Jeffrey Friedman has identified at least four different versions of communitarian 
thought. See Jeffrey Friedman, “The Politics of Communitarianism” (1994) 8 Critical Rev. 297. 
13  Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction (1990), at 207. 
14  Id. 
15  Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1988), at 3. 
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antecedent to choice; he cannot belong to any community where the 
self itself could be at stake. Such a community – call it constitutive as 
against merely cooperative – would engage the identity as well as the 
interests of the participants, and so implicate its members in a 
citizenship more thoroughgoing than the unencumbered self can 
know.16 
In other words, for communitarians, the individual must be under-
stood as existing within the community and its network of social and 
moral arrangements and not prior, or in opposition, to the community. 
This relational and community-based theory of the person led communi-
tarians to place less emphasis on the subjective and atomistic aspects of 
individualism associated with liberal theory.17 
A second, related theme among communitarians is to emphasize the 
importance of community interests. This follows logically from the first 
theme. If the individual is understood as embedded in the community, 
then in order to accommodate the interests of the individual one has to 
identify and accommodate the interests of the community.18 Thus, what 
emerges is a “shared understanding both of the good for man and of the 
good of that community.”19  
These themes are inherent in the communitarians’ moral compass. 
In their view, understanding the importance of the community to the 
identity and social and personal development of the individual is to 
show greater respect for the dignity of that individual: 
Our sense of self, including our sense of worthiness, is strongly 
influenced by our social settings, including the prevailing moral 
frameworks. As social beings, most of us need to feel that we are 
valued members of the community. A social and political system that 
systematically devalues and demeans a key element in our identity 
                                                                                                                                
16  Michael J. Sandel, “The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self” (1984) 12 
Politcal Theory 81, at 87.  
17  Kymlicka, supra, note 13, at 216. 
18  Kymlicka calls this the “social thesis.” See Kymlicka, supra, note 13, at 216-17. 
19  MacIntyre, supra, note 11, at 250. For example, this paper will not focus on more ex-
pansive or “harder” communitarian themes wherein the state abandons neutrality to advocate and 
preserve the “morals” or “conception of the good” of the broader community. See Kymlicka, supra, 
note 13, at 217-24. 
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cannot but affect how we live our lives, including how much actual 
liberty we have (even if our formal liberty-rights are protected).20 
The evident and key rationale for the communitarian movement is 
its promotion of a more accurate representation of the relationship be-
tween individual and community — one that is a good deal more nu-
anced and integrated and one that provides greater respect for the 
individual.  
These communitarian themes have had deep influence on recent po-
litical theory.21 Indeed, as noted by Hilliard Aronovitch, prominent lib-
eral theorists like John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin have “reformulated” 
their respective liberal theories to take into account the important role of 
community.22 Given this influence, it is not surprising that these themes 
have emerged in Canadian legal commentary and scholarship.  
In fact, many concerns regarding the initial enactment of the Charter 
could be characterized as communitarian. As a traditional liberal consti-
tution enumerating mainly individual rights, the Charter brought about a 
sea change in Canadian constitutional “ethos” toward more individualis-
tic values.23 One central concern was that the Charter prioritized indi-
vidualism and personal rights over the broader social concerns of the 
community. Thus, Andrew Petter notably wrote that the Charter is “a 
nineteenth-century liberal document set loose on a twentieth-century 
welfare state” that was “more likely to undermine than to advance the 
interests of the socially and economically disadvantaged Canadians.”24 
In this regard, as James B. Kelly noted, section 15 of the Charter — as 
the provision that protects the individual’s right to equality — was seen 
as a particular looming threat to the “diversity” of the Canadian com-
munity: 
                                                                                                                                
20  Richard Nordahl, “Ronald Dworkin and the Defense of Homosexual Rights” (1995) 8 
Can. J.L. & Juris. 19, at 40-41. 
21  See, e.g., the discussion between prominent commentators Charles Taylor, Michael 
Walzer, Susan Wolf, Steven C. Rockefeller and Jurgen Habermas in Gutmann (ed.), Multicultural-
ism: Examining the Politics of Recognition (Princeton University Press, 1998).  
22  See Hilliard Aronovitch, “A Liberal Reading of the American Constitution: A Critical 
Notice of Ronald Dworkin” (1997) 10 Can. J.L. & Juris. 521, at 523-24. 
23  Roger Gibbins, “The American Constitution and Canadian Constitutional Politics”, in 
Marian C. McKenna (ed.), The Canadian and American Constitutions in Comparative Perspective 
(1993) 131, at 139. 
24  Andrew Petter, “Immaculate Deception: The Charter’s Hidden Agenda” (1987) 45 Ad-
vocate 857, at 857. 
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The equality rights in section 15 of the Charter came into force in 
1985, and it was feared that this section would pose the most serious 
threat to federal diversity in Canada. Russell suggested that section 
15(1) would have a centralizing effect because “many of the social, 
economic and cultural policies to which the Supreme Court will apply 
egalitarian norms have been subject to determination at the provincial 
level.”25 
Similar to the concerns of the communitarians, legal scholars predicted 
that the Charter’s individualistic values would prove detrimental to the 
broader interests of the Canadian polity. 
These concerns and criticisms did not go unanswered. The common 
and simple response was that the Charter, notwithstanding its individu-
alistic values, provided ample opportunity to address the interests of the 
community within the section 1 justification analysis.26 Equally, this was 
the Supreme Court’s answer.27 Early in its jurisprudence, the Court 
expressed its view that individual equality rights under section 15 
should be defined broadly, while any competing interests — such as the 
social interests of the community — should be addressed under section 
1. In Miron v. Trudel, McLachlin J., as she then was, wrote: 
This division of the analysis between s. 15(1) and s. 1 accords with the 
injunction to which this Court has adhered from the earliest Charter 
cases: courts should interpret the enumerated rights in a broad and 
generous fashion, leaving the task of narrowing the prima facie 
                                                                                                                                
25  James B. Kelly, “The Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Rebalancing of Liberal 
Constitutionalism in Canada, 1982-1997” (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 625, at 639. 
26
  In the words of Professor Wayne MacKay, section 1 provides an “escape hatch” for the 
legislature to address important competing interests and social concerns: MacKay, “The Legisla-
ture, The Executive and the Courts: The Delicate Balance of Power or Who is Running this Coun-
try Anyway?” (2001) 24 Dalhousie L.J. 37, at 55. Professors Kent Roach and Peter Hogg, among 
others, have argued that section 1 provides not only an opportunity for the Court to balance compet-
ing interests, but also allows the legislature to participate in a “Charter dialogue” with the Courts. 
See e.g., Kent Roach, “Constitutional and Common Law Dialogues Between the Supreme Court 
and Canadian Legislatures” (2001) 80 Can. Bar Rev. 481, at 483; Peter Hogg and Allison Thornton, 
“Reply to ‘Six Degrees of Dialogue’ ” (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 529; Kent Roach, The Supreme 
Court on Trial: Judicial Activism or Democratic Dialogue (2001). 
27  R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R 103 [hereinafter “Oakes”]. For a dis-
cussion, see J. Daniels, “Valid Despite Vagueness: The Relationship Between Vagueness and 
Shifting Objective” (1994) 58 Sask. L. Rev. 101. 
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protection thus granted to conform to conflicting social and legislative 
interests to s. 1.28 
Accordingly, that early approach led the Court to adopt a traditional 
liberal and individualistic analysis of equality; individuals and their 
interests, such as “freedom” and autonomy, were understood in conflict 
with or in opposition to the interests of the community: 
This principle [of equality under section 15] recognizes the dignity of 
each human being and each person’s freedom to develop his body and 
spirit as he or she desires, subject to such limitations as may be 
justified by the interests of the community as a whole. It recognizes 
that society is based on individuals who are different from each other, 
and that a free and democratic society must accommodate and respect 
these differences.29 
Here, McLachlin J., in contrast to communitarians, posed the interests of 
individuals as prior to and separate from any interests of the “commu-
nity as a whole.” 
However, this has often been an imperfect balance. In several cases, 
the Court has taken a narrow approach to interests considered under 
section 1. For example, in its decision in Sauvé30 the majority rejected 
Parliament’s rationale for limiting the voting rights of prisoners, which 
drew heavily upon “social and political philosophy,” as an improper 
attempt to insulate the right violation from the Court’s review.31 Further, 
under section 1 the Court has repeatedly rejected economic considera-
tions of the government as a sufficient rationale to limit Charter rights.32 
In Singh, Wilson J., writing for the majority, expressed serious doubt 
that the government could use “utilitarian considerations” as legitimate 
reasons to limit Charter rights.33 If utilitarian concerns cannot provide a 
basis to limit rights, then what sorts of community interests does section 
1 involve? 
                                                                                                                                
28  Miron, [1995] S.C.J. No. 44, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418, at 486. 
29  Miron, id., at 494. 
30  Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [2002] S.C.J. No. 66, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519. 
31  Id., at paras. 10-13.  
32  See, e.g., Schachter v. Canada, [1992] S.C.J. No. 68, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679 [hereinafter 
“Schachter”]; Egan, [1995] S.C.J. No. 43, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513; Reference re Remuneration of 
Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island, [1997] S.C.J. No. 75, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3; 
Singh v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1985] S.C.J. No. 11, 1 S.C.R. 177 
[hereinafter “Singh”]. 
33  Singh, id., at 218-19. 
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The more serious problem with the earlier cases relates to the com-
munitarian criticisms, noted above, directed at more individualistic 
accounts of identity that pose individual interests in opposition to com-
munity interests. If, as communitarians contend, such an account of the 
rights and interests of a person does not properly respect the dignity of 
that person, then a different equality analysis would appear warranted.  
Of course, the Court’s approach under section 15 has evolved since 
Miron. As the Supreme Court developed the meaning of the right in 
section 15, it focused on the notion of “human dignity” to delineate the 
true equality violations from the false, since not every distinction drawn 
between individuals or groups could be discriminatory.34 In Law the 
Court first articulated “human dignity” as the core interest protected by 
section 15, and required claimants to establish a violation of “essential 
human dignity.”35 This apparently “new” prerequisite, involving objec-
tive and subjective components, led many commentators to argue that 
the Court had narrowed its approach to section 15.36 Yet other commen-
tators, such as James Hendry, held a contrary opinion, noting that the 
changes in Law were necessary given the Court’s new focus on “human 
dignity,” a largely subjective and individualistic concept: 
Dignity is inherently a subjective concept. As Nagel suggested, 
political legitimacy depends on accommodating the subjective or 
partial concerns of the individual who is subject to the laws. The Court 
has recognized since Andrews the subjective devastation wrought by 
discrimination imbedded in the laws, in stereotypes, prejudice, and 
wrongful assumptions, to be unacceptable, repugnant, and the worse 
kind of oppression.37  
                                                                                                                                
34  The notion of “human dignity” moved towards the centre of the s. 15(1) framework over 
a number of decisions, with discussions in earlier decisions, such as McKinney v. University of 
Guelph, [1990] S.C.J. No. 122, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229 at 391 per Wilson J., Egan, supra, note 32, at 
543-51 per L’Heureux-Dubé J., and Miron, [1995] S.C.J. No. 44, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418, at 486-99, 
per: McLachlin J., culminating in its crystallization as the “core interest” in s. 15(1) in Law, [1999] 
S.C.J. No. 12, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497, at para. 47.  
35
  Law, supra, note 34, at para. 47. Many have criticized the Court for this development, 
arguing that this change has narrowed the rights protected under s. 15(1). For a discussion of these 
criticisms and a thoughtful response, see Donna Greschner, “Does Law Advance the Cause of 
Equality?” (2001) 27 Queen’s L.J. 299. 
36
  See, e.g., Martin, supra, note 3, at 319-32; Ross, supra, note 3; Nishisato, supra, note 3; 
Hogg, supra, note 3, at 1007-1015; Baines, supra, note 3. For a discussion of these criticisms and a 
thoughtful response, see Greschner, supra, note 35. 
37  Hendry, supra, note 3, at 170. Greschner makes a similar point when she writes: 
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Indeed, Iacobucci J., when discussing the notion of human dignity 
in Law, emphasized subjective elements of the concept, writing that 
“human dignity” is concerned with “whether an individual or group 
feels self-respect and self-worth.”38 Similarly, Sheilah Martin has noted, 
“dignity belongs more to the realm of individual rights than to group-
based historical disadvantage.”39 This emphasis on an inherently indi-
vidualistic concept like human dignity is not illogical. After all, the 
rights under section 15 are posed as individual rights — why should 
competing interests be employed to narrow those rights? 
2. More Recent Communitarian Criticisms in Legal Commentary 
With the continued individualistic framework of the section 15 
analysis under Law, further criticisms with communitarian themes have 
emerged. For example, Allan Hutchinson, though not proclaiming him-
self a communitarian, has criticized rights adjudication, such as equality 
rights challenges under section 15, as based on an individualistic liberal 
paradigm that “provides an essentially false account of human commu-
nity.”40 He has also advocated a “democratic dialogue” that emphasizes 
relationships between individuals in communities with their “shared 
commitments and mutual understandings.”41 Similarly, Donna Gre-
schner has argued that a proper “purposive” approach to section 15 
would focus on promoting the “belonging of individuals” in distinct 
communities.42 These approaches involve communitarian ideas. Other 
                                                                                                                                
Draping an allegation of discrimination in dignity language deeply personalizes it and 
brings it to the very heart of an individual’s sense of self-worth. This makes the allega-
tion more emotion-laden, and thus more rhetorically powerful… The problem with 
feelings is that no one can argue against them.  
See Greschner, supra, note 35, at 313. 
38  Law, supra, note 34, at para. 53. For a discussion of the varying subjective and objective 
approaches to equality see: Sophia Moreau, “The Wrongs of Unequal Treatment” (2004) 54 Univ. 
of Toronto L.J. 291. 
39  Martin, supra, note 3, at 329. 
40  See Allan C. Hutchinson, Waiting for Coraf: A Critique of Law and Rights (University 
of Toronto Press, 1995), at 125 [hereinafter “Coraf”]. See also Allan C. Hutchinson, “Michael and 
Me: A Postmodern Friendship” (1996) 33 Osgoode Hall L.J. 239. 
41  Coraf, id., at 197. 
42  Greschner, supra, note 35, at 314-15. 
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recent commentators have articulated criticisms with similar communi-
tarian themes.43  
But such concerns are not limited to the academy. Perhaps the most 
obviously communitarian concerns have been articulated by a few 
members of the Court itself. Often in dissent, Charles Gonthier J. strove 
for a communitarian approach to Charter analysis in his judgments. 
Further, in published commentary he also focused on communitarian 
aspects of constitutionalism,44 asking what happened to the third branch 
of the ideal of “liberty, equality and fraternity” — fraternity being the 
proxy for “community.”45 In Figueroa,46 Gonthier J., for the minority, 
wrote: 
A right’s purpose may be connected not only to purely individual 
interests but also to communitarian or group concerns... the right to 
equality protected by s. 15 of the Charter is expressly an individual 
right, but the concept of freedom from discrimination is related (as the 
grounds of discrimination listed in s. 15(1) demonstrate) to the 
individual’s membership in certain social groups and to the 
relationships between minority groups and Canadian society.47 
There, Gonthier J. explicitly linked the right under section 15 not to 
individualistic but to communitarian concerns. Likewise, LeBel J., per-
haps Gonthier J.’s heir as the communitarian on the Court, situated 
section 15 as a “communitarian component” of the constitution when he 
wrote, in R. v. Advance Cutting & Coring Ltd.: 
 One approach to the constitutional protection of civil liberties 
views the Charter as essentially designed to protect individual rights…  
                                                                                                                                
43  In the context of s. 15, see e.g., David Brown, “Reconciling Equality and Other Rights: 
Paradigm Lost?” (2003) 15 Nat’l J. Const. L. 1. In the context of other provisions of the Charter  
(s. 24), see Julianne Parfett, “A Triumph of Liberalism: The Supreme Court of Canada and the 
Exclusion of Evidence” (2002) 40 Alta. L. Rev. 299; Kent Roach, “The Attorney General and the 
Charter Revisited” (2000) 50 Univ. of Toronto L.J. 1; Mark Carter, “Reconsidering the Charter and 
Electoral Boundaries” (1999) 22 Dal. L.J. 53. 
44  See Justice Gonthier, “Law and Morality” (2003) 29 Queen’s L.J. 408; Justice Gonthier, 
“Liberty, Equality, Fraternity: The Forgotten Leg of the Trilogy, or the Unspoken Third Pillar of 
Democracy” (2000) 45 McGill L.J. 567 [hereinafter “Fraternity”]. 
45  Fraternity, id., at 569. 
46  Figueroa v. Canada (Attorney General), [2003] S.C.J. No. 37, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 912. 
47  Id., at para. 130. 
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 Nevertheless, the communitarian components of the Canadian 
Constitution are often overlooked. Section 15 equality rights are 
concerned not only with the position of individuals, but also with the 
situation of groups in society.48 
As this brief survey illustrates, a few members of the Court and nu-
merous legal commentators have propounded a more communitarian 
approach to equality under section 15, although those concerns have 
largely remained unanswered. The fact that the referenced judgments of 
LeBel and Gonthier JJ. failed to garner support from the majority of 
judges on the Court indicates the relative marginal role these concerns 
have played in the case law. 
Change is apparently afoot. In our view, the Supreme Court of Can-
ada has moved toward a more communitarian approach to equality 
rights under section 15. As we argue, the Court’s decisions in 2004 
demonstrate aspects of the articulated communitarian themes:  
(1) greater emphasis on importance of the community to the individual 
and (2) a corresponding movement away from the traditional liberal 
understanding of the person based on a subjective and individualistic 
perspective.  
III. TOWARDS AN EMPHASIS ON SOCIAL COMMUNITY 
1.  The Canadian Foundation Case 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Canadian Foundation for Chil-
dren Youth and the Law v. Canada,49 often referred to as the “spanking 
case,” illustrates a thoroughly communitarian understanding of the per-
son existing in a community of fundamental social relationships. The 
context of the family unit — perhaps the essential human group or 
community — and the school environment50 put the liberal individualis-
tic approach to section 15 to its true test. In its challenge, the Foundation 
argued, inter alia, that the decriminalization inherent in section 43 of the 
Criminal Code violated the equality rights of children and sent a mes-
                                                                                                                                
48  [2001] S.C.J. No. 68, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 209, at paras. 167-68. 
49  [2004] S.C.J. No. 6, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 76, at para. 1. 
50  Section 43 also protects persons standing in the place of parents and teachers who use 
reasonable force in respect of their different circumstances. In the school context protected actions 
are unlikely to include true disciplinary action, like spanking, but only the application of force to 
ensure childrens’ safety. See Canadian Foundation, supra, note 49, at paras. 1, 40.  
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sage that they were “less worthy” as human beings.51 This argument 
rested on the untenable idea that children develop in an abstract envi-
ronment or bubble, removed from the relationships essential to the 
child’s development as a socialized being. The communitarian approach 
to the limits of section 15 provided the necessary “reality check” to 
achieve the correct outcome. 
Writing for the majority, the Chief Justice found no violation of sec-
tion 15(1). She made this finding in spite of her recognition that section 
43 involved differential treatment based on an enumerated ground 
(age).52 Further, she acknowledged that a majority of the contextual 
factors listed in Law — pre-existing disadvantage, nature of the interest 
affected, absence of ameliorative purpose — supported the Foundation’s 
case.53 In the result, however, these factors held no consequence. The 
majority’s decision was determined solely by the remaining contextual 
factor — “needs correspondence.” 
Some background to the “needs correspondence” concept is appro-
priate. In determining whether a claim is established under section 15, a 
Court must consider whether impugned legislation corresponds with or 
takes into account the “actual need, capacity or circumstances” of the 
claimant or claimants.54 This is the “needs correspondence” factor. The 
factor first gained clear definition in Law where it was grouped with 
other “contextual factors” in applying section 15(1).55 However, as late 
as 2002, the Court was still internally conflicted about the importance of 
the needs correspondence factor in the section 15(1) framework.56 The 
Court’s decision in Canadian Foundation may have finally decided 
some of these questions. In that decision, the needs correspondence 
factor provided the hook for the Court to apply a communitarian ap-
proach to the section 15 analysis.  
                                                                                                                                
51  Canadian Foundation, id., at para. 50. 
52  Canadian Foundation, id., at para. 52. 
53  Canadian Foundation, id., at para. 56. 
54  Law, supra, note 34, at para. 88. 
55  Law, id., at paras. 69-71. 
56  E.g., in Lavoie, [2002] S.C.J. No. 24, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 769, a clear disagreement existed 
among members of the Court as to the centrality and application of the “needs correspondence” 
branch of Law. Justice Bastarache, writing the majority opinion for three other members of the 
Court, placed little emphasis on the needs correspondence factor. In contrast, Arbour J., in a minori-
ty opinion concurring in the result (LeBel J. concurring), explicitly disagreed with Bastarache J.’s 
narrow characterization of the needs correspondence analysis.  
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After asking whether there was a “lack of correspondence” (be-
tween the claimants’ needs and the section 43 defence), the Chief Jus-
tice went on to explore the various “needs” of children:  
Children need to be protected from abusive treatment. They are 
vulnerable members of Canadian society and Parliament and the 
Executive act admirably when they shield children from psychological 
and physical harm. In so acting, the government responds to the 
critical need of all children for a safe environment. Yet this is not the 
only need of children. Children also depend on parents and teachers 
for guidance and discipline, to protect them from harm and to promote 
their healthy development within society. A stable and secure family 
and school setting is essential to this growth process. 57 
After noting the “dual” needs of children in the circumstances, the 
Chief Justice found that section 43 was a reasonable attempt by Parlia-
ment to “accommodate both of these needs.”58 By allowing parents and 
teachers to carry out the reasonable education and guidance essential to 
children’s development without “threat of sanction by the criminal law” 
— although ensuring that harmful force is punished — section 43 corre-
sponds to these circumstances.59 This needs correspondence supported 
the finding that section 43 was not an affront to children’s dignity within 
the meaning of section 15(1).60 
2.  A Communitarian Approach to the Child’s Needs 
The majority’s approach to the needs of children in Canadian 
Foundation is clearly communitarian. In discussing the various needs of 
children, the Chief Justice looked at the broader notion of children as 
individuals existing within a community with broader needs for growth 
and stability within a social environment. In other words, the majority 
implicitly deployed what communitarian Charles Taylor might call a 
“dialogical” theory of identity, that conceptualizes social relationships 
as fundamental to personal development.61 According to Taylor, our 
identities are inherently tied to our relationships with those people 
                                                                                                                                
57  Canadian Foundation, supra, note 49, at para. 58 (emphasis added). 
58  Canadian Foundation, id., at para. 59. 
59  Canadian Foundation, id., at para. 59. 
60  Canadian Foundation, id., at para. 68. 
61  Charles Taylor, The Malaise of Modernity (Concord: Anansi Press, 1991), at 33-34. 
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George Herbert Mead famously called our “significant others.”62 Thus, 
Prof. K. Anthony Appiah, who also advocates a dialogical theory of 
identity, writes: 
After all, we have it in our power to some extent to make our children 
into the kind of people who will want to maintain our culture. 
Precisely because the monological view of identity is incorrect, there 
is no individual nugget waiting in each child to express itself, if only 
family and society permit its unfettered development. We have to help 
children make themselves, and we have to do so according to our 
values because children do not begin with values of their own.63 
Given the majority’s broader approach to “needs”, it is not surpris-
ing that this was an important point of departure for Binnie J. who dis-
sented. For Binnie J., the majority improperly strayed from the 
subjective individual perspective of the claimant children. Thus, he 
wrote: 
 While the child needs the family, the protection of s. 43 is given 
not to the child but to the parent or teacher who is using “reasonable” 
force for “correction.” Section 43 protects parents and teachers, not 
children. A child “needs” no less protection under the Criminal Code 
than an adult does. 64 
In other words, Binnie J. disagreed with the Chief Justice’s more 
expansive communitarian approach to the limits of section 15. For him, 
the needs of the family were not the needs of the children. The only 
needs to be protected under section 15, were the specific needs of chil-
dren to the exclusion of the interests or role of parents or guardians 
around them. Justification of the violation for good policy reasons 
should be left to section 1.65  
At its core, the disagreement between the Chief Justice and Binnie J. 
was about their different perspectives on how to characterize the “need” 
in question. Justice Binnie remained focused on the individualistic needs 
                                                                                                                                
62  George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1934). 
63 Anthony Appiah, “Identity, Authenticity, Survival: Multicultural Societies and Social Re-
production” in Amy Gutmann (ed), Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, 
(1994) at 158-59. 
64 Canadian Foundation, supra, note 49, at para. 100. 
65 Canadian Foundation, id., at para. 100. 
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of the claimant children vis-à-vis their parents and guardians, while the 
Chief Justice looked at the broader notion of the children as individuals 
within a community and social environment.  
Justice Binnie’s approach to “needs” in Canadian Foundation is 
more consistent with an individualistic approach to section 15 evident in 
past jurisprudence, which makes the departure from that approach by 
the majority all the more noteworthy. As recently as 2002, a majority of 
the Court had emphasized the need to approach equality from the indi-
vidualized and subjective perspective of the claimant.66  
It is evident in Canadian Foundation that the Supreme Court moved 
toward a more communitarian approach to section 15, in emphasizing 
the importance of the social community of the individual and the inter-
action of the two in defining equality rights. From a traditional liberal 
perspective, which pits individual interests against those of the larger 
community, one could easily suggest that the effect of this changed 
approach to section 15 is a limitation or diminishment of equality rights 
in favour of stronger community interests. It is important to note, how-
ever, that this characterization — individual versus community — is 
exactly what communitarians attempt to challenge. In the next section, 
we analyze another context in which the Court has recently underscored 
the importance of community. 
IV. TOWARD ECONOMIC COMMUNITY INTERESTS 
1.  Community Interests in Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. 
N.A.P.E. 
As already noted, a key theme of communitarian theory is recogni-
tion of the importance of community interests. To speak of “community 
interest” may seem abstract, but for many communitarian theorists it is a 
very concrete term that represents the broad variety of collective inter-
ests of the community, including social, political, and, in some cases, 
economic interests. In Sandel’s view, the “community” constitutes not 
just “shared self-understandings” of people but also how those interests 
are “embodied” in “institutional arrangements.”67 Such institutional 
                                                                                                                                
66  See the comments of Bastarache J. (at para. 47) and endorsed by McLachlin C.J.C. and 
L’Heureux-Dubé J. (at para. 1) in Lavoie v. Canada, supra, note 56, at para. 47. 
67  Sandel, supra, note 11, at 173. 
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arrangements include, as Philip Selznick points out, the inherent ties 
among social, political and economic interests of the community: 
Another theme that bears on the communitarian perspective is what we 
might call the principle of continuity. Sociological interpretation is not 
comfortable with clear lines drawn between one human activity and 
another, one social sphere and another. In sociological jurisprudence 
we are uneasy with the separation of law and politics, law and 
economics, law and morality. The same may be said of any other 
social sphere, whether it be education, technology, science, business, 
or national security.68 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Newfoundland v. NAPE69 draws 
heavily upon this notion that social interests are invariably tied to other 
community interests, including economic interests. In so doing, the 
decision in NAPE represents a remarkable shift in the Court’s position 
on the importance of community economic interests.  
In NAPE, the claimant union challenged section 9 of the Public Sec-
tor Restraint Act introduced by the Newfoundland and Labrador gov-
ernment to limit budget spending. Among other measures, the law 
deferred pay equity payments by three years and effectively released the 
government from obligations to pay $24-million under a 1988 agree-
ment to redress sex-based wage discrimination in the government work-
force. The claimants argued, among other things, that the government’s 
attempt to legislate itself out of its obligation to alleviate discriminatory 
government practices ran afoul of section 15(1). In response, the gov-
ernment argued mainly that its financial crisis was unprecedented and so 
serious that it had no choice but to restrain government spending. In 
short, deficit reduction, not pay equity, was a paramount public concern.  
Given the highly political and contentious issues involved, the Su-
preme Court’s decision was greatly anticipated. Indeed, the Newfound-
land Court of Appeal’s decision touched off various debates, including 
an informative, and at times heated, exchange among academic com-
mentators.70 
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69  [2004] S.C.J. No. 61, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 381. 
70  See Sujit Choudhry & Claire E. Hunter, “Measuring Judicial Activism on the Supreme 
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The Court upheld the legislation. It was bound to find that the provi-
sion violated the workers’ section 15(1) rights, since the aim of the 
legislation was to remove redress for previous discriminatory actions. 
The legislation was justified in limiting those equality rights in the cir-
cumstances because of the financial emergency. The Court fully accept-
ed budgetary restraints as a concern that was “pressing and substantial”71 
enough to limit the claimant’s equality rights. Writing for the Court, 
Binnie J. stated: 
 In my view, the union’s argument that budgetary issues should 
effectively be given no weight in these circumstances goes too far. 
With respect, the need to address a fiscal crisis such as that described 
by the President of the Treasury Board was a pressing and substantial 
legislative objective.72 
On its face, this holding represents an important development. His-
torically, the Court has been entirely adverse to finding “financial con-
siderations” as a sufficient justification for limiting any Charter right, let 
alone equality rights. First, in Schachter, the leading authority on sec-
tion 52(1) remedies and, in addition, a decision involving a section 
15(1) violation, the Supreme Court emphasized that budgetary concerns 
were not a legitimate reason to limit rights as defined by the Charter. 
The Court could not have been more categorical in its position: 
This Court has held, and rightly so, that budgetary considerations 
cannot be used to justify a violation under s. 1. However, such 
considerations are clearly relevant once a violation which does not 
survive s. 1 has been established, s. 52 is determined to have been 
engaged and the Court turns its attention to what action should be 
taken thereunder.73 
In that case, the cost of remedying the violation was estimated at 
$50-million to $500-million. In spite of the serious worry that the gov-
ernment may have had over the economic health of the community, 
“budgetary concerns” could not support justification for limiting rights. 
                                                                                                                                
da’” (2004) 49 McGill L.J. 741; Sujit Choudhry & Claire E. Hunter, “Continuing the Conversation: 
A Reply to Manfredi and Kelly” (2004) 49 McGill L.J. 765. 
71  The first branch of the Oakes test. See R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 
103 [hereinafter “Oakes”]. 
72  NAPE, supra, note 69, at para. 74. 
73  Schachter, [1992] S.C.J. No. 68, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679, at 709 (emphasis added). 
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Rather, such considerations only became relevant to shaping a proper 
remedy. 
This resistance may be largely explained with optics. As Abella J., 
as she then was, wrote in Rosenberg v. Canada (Attorney General) 
when dealing with equality and discrimination, monetary concerns ap-
pear less important:  
Cost/benefit analyses are not readily applicable to equality violations 
because of the inherent incomparability of the monetary impacts 
involved. Remedying discrimination will always appear to be more 
fiscally burdensome than beneficial on a balance sheet. On one side of 
the budgetary ledger will be the calculable cost required to rectify the 
discriminatory measure; on the other side, it will likely be found that 
the cost to the public of discriminating is not as concretely measurable. 
The considerable but incalculable benefits of eliminating discrimination 
are therefore not visible in the equation, making the analysis an 
unreliable source of policy decision making.74  
In Egan, after referring to both the Court’s general reluctance to ac-
cord much weight to financial consideration and the Schachter admoni-
tion, Iacobucci J., in dissent, stated: 
This is certainly the case when the financial motivations are not, as in 
the case at bar, supported by more persuasive arguments as to why the 
infringement amounts to a reasonable limit.75  
At that point “more persuasive arguments” could potentially justify 
limiting a Charter right, but what those arguments could be was un-
known.  
NAPE might be understood as the case where the meaning of “more 
persuasive arguments” is illuminated. But a close examination of the 
decision provides some doubt for the proposition. The Newfoundland 
and Labrador government’s sole motivation for the offending legislation 
was “financial.” In coming to his conclusion, Binnie J. acknowledged that 
the legislation suffered from the untenable “sole purpose” reflected in Egan 
— that financial considerations alone could not justify limits on rights.76 
The magnitude of the financial concerns — terming the circumstances a 
                                                                                                                                
74  [1998] O.J. No. 1627, at para. 42, 38 O.R. (3d) 577 (C.A.). 
75  Egan, [1995] S.C.J. No. 43, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513, at para. 194. 
76  NAPE, supra, note 69, at para. 72. 
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“crisis” — was the only distinguishing feature. No other “persuasive 
arguments” were evident, to ground the following statement: 
Nevertheless, the courts cannot close their eyes to the periodic 
occurrence of financial emergencies when measures must be taken to 
juggle priorities to see a government through the crisis. It cannot be 
said that in weighing a delay in the timetable for implementing pay 
equity against the closing of hundreds of hospital beds, as here, a 
government is engaged in an exercise “whose sole purpose is 
financial.” The weighing exercise has as much to do with social values 
as it has to do with dollars.77 
How could the significance of the financial crisis in NAPE be so ex-
ceptional that the concerns of the government, though articulated only in 
budgetary language, could be justified in overriding equality rights? 
After all, it is the government’s job to juggle priorities against crises and 
their expenditures.78  
2. The Link — Social Goods, Values and Community Interests 
The subtle key in NAPE was equating the legislation with the provi-
sion of essential social goods. With this device, the Court’s decision in 
NAPE disclosed another communitarian theme — the economic inter-
ests of the community, once disregarded as a justificatory factor, emerge 
as a consideration in government limits on equality. The decision in 
NAPE is important because it represents the Court’s linking, for the first 
time, of government economic measures with essential values of the 
community. Thus, Binnie J. wrote:  
The government in 1991 was not just debating rights versus dollars but 
rights versus hospital beds, rights versus layoffs, rights versus jobs, 
rights versus education and rights versus social welfare. The 
requirement to reduce expenditures, and the allocation of the necessary 
cuts, was undertaken to promote other values of a free and democratic 
society.79 
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As implied earlier, “dollars” in Charter cases have always meant 
government choices between providing the service or benefit in issue 
and delivering other services and benefits. In NAPE, for Binnie J., the 
economic interests of the community, properly understood, were linked 
to numerous other communitarian values and interests, including 
healthcare, welfare and education. Thus, he suggested that steps taken 
by the government to reduce expenditures were essential to promote 
other democratic values. Put another way, the Court appears to have 
appreciated that the interests of the claimants themselves — in terms of 
access to proper health, welfare and education — were tied to the eco-
nomic interests of the broader community.  
The exceptional emphasis on economic community in NAPE ap-
pears to diminish the individual’s right to equality. Strictly speaking, the 
scope of the equality right under section 15 is not reduced, at least not in 
the same way as in Canadian Foundation. However, the expanded 
scope for justification — the inclusion of a previously unacceptable 
factor — establishes the same net effect. Yet, communitarians likely 
would characterize this assessment as exemplifying the traditional liber-
al approach to rights — one that does not take into account the complex 
ties between individual and community. In linking individual social 
interests to the economic interests of the community, the Court has 
recognized that the ultimate interests and equality rights of the individu-
al are equally served within the larger domain. 
V. THE SHIFT AWAY FROM THE “SUBJECTIVE” IN SECTION 15 
So far, we have argued that the Supreme Court, in 2004, has taken a 
more communitarian approach to the meaning of equality by a height-
ened appreciation and protection of the social and economic interests of 
the community. Another central theme of the modern communitarian 
movement is the shift away from more individualistic, and thus more 
subjective, accounts of personal identity and belonging. This theme is 
also evident in the Court’s equality jurisprudence in the past year. 
In keeping with its traditional framework for adjudicating equality 
rights under section 15, Bastarache J., writing for the majority in Lavoie, 
stressed the importance of the subjective analysis of human dignity: 
The concepts of dignity and freedom are not amorphous and, in my 
view, do not invite the kind of balancing of individual against state 
interest that is required under s. 1 of the Charter. On the contrary, the 
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subjective inquiry into human dignity requires the claimant to provide 
a rational foundation for her experience of discrimination in the sense 
that a reasonable person similarly situated would share that 
experience. 80 
However, as we discuss below, the Court’s recent approach has 
moved away from this subjective perspective of the equality rights 
claimant. 
1.  The Move Away From a Subjective Perspective in Comparator 
Selection 
In Hodge v. Canada, the claimant challenged the constitutionality of 
the definition of “spouse” in the Canada Pension Plan (CPP) legislation. 
Ms. Hodge had been a common law spouse who separated from her 
common law husband before he died. Cohabiting common law spouses 
could receive a survivor’s pension under the Canada Pension Plan. 
Spouses who had been married, but subsequently divorced, could re-
ceive CPP survivor’s pension. Ms. Hodge was denied the survivor’s 
benefit because she was not co-habiting with her common law spouse at 
the time of his death. She argued that the legislation violated her equali-
ty right, based on marital status. The CPP Tribunal and Federal Court of 
Appeal agreed. The Supreme Court did not. 
The section 15 analysis requires a court to find “discrimination” in 
the impugned provision, since not every distinction is discriminatory in 
the constitutionally protected sense. The Supreme Court has expended 
great effort in developing the model to discern discrimination from the 
innumerable distinctions created by all legislation. One tool in the anal-
ysis is the selection of a “comparator” (usually a group) that provides a 
measure for the claim and removes it from unworkable abstraction. The 
choice and description of the comparator group is crucial to the outcome 
of many equality cases. Employing one comparator group will result in 
a successful claim, while choosing another will lead to failure.81 
From the outset, it was clear in Hodge that the selection of the prop-
er comparator group would determine the Court’s decision. Writing for 
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the Court, Binnie J. stated in his first paragraph that a section 15 chal-
lenge “will likely fail” unless the comparator selection is right.82 Not 
surprisingly, the Court’s decision turned on the point. In the lower 
courts the claimant had identified “married spouses living apart at the 
time of the contributor’s death” as her chosen comparator. The Court of 
Appeal accepted the claimant’s selection, which led to the finding that 
the CPP legislation was, indeed, in violation of the claimant’s section 15 
right.  
The Supreme Court rejected Ms. Hodge’s choice of comparator 
group. Instead, Binnie J. held that the claimant’s proper comparator was 
“divorced spouses.” After this finding, the challenge could not succeed, 
simply because divorced spouses are also not entitled to the survivor’s 
pension under the CPP; the distinction between Ms. Hodge’s group and 
the comparator disappeared. Once the comparator group changed, the 
entire section 15(1) analysis of the Court of Appeal was changed fun-
damentally and the claim was destined to fail. 
Justice Binnie disagreed with the approach taken by the Court of 
Appeal with respect to comparator selection. The Court of Appeal 
showed deference to the claimant’s selection, adopting the presumption 
that the claimant’s choice of comparator should be respected short of 
contrary evidence.83 On this point Binnie J. wrote: 
 In my view, with respect, the Federal Court of Appeal erred in 
concluding that a court is required to “adopt the comparator group 
chosen by the applicant unless it can be shown that there is a paucity 
of evidence or a failure to plead that comparator” (para. 23). While it 
is up to the claimant to make an initial choice of “the person, group, or 
groups with whom he or she wishes to be compared” (emphasis 
added), the correctness of that choice is a matter of law for the court to 
determine: Granovsky, supra, at paras. 47, 52 and 64.84 
In other words, the Court of Appeal erred in law when it deferred to 
the claimant’s choice of the correct comparator. Justice Binnie went 
even further. He determined that it is mandatory for a court to intervene 
on this point: 
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 Where “the differential treatment is not between the groups 
identified by the claimant, but rather between other groups” (Law, 
supra, at para. 58), accordingly, it is the duty of the court to step in and 
measure the claim to equality rights in the proper context and against 
the proper standard.85  
The Court followed a similar approach in Auton. In that case, the 
claimants’ children were autistic and the British Columbia provincial 
government had refused to fund a somewhat controversial, but apparent-
ly effective, autism treatment. The parents challenged the provincial 
legislation that limited the services covered by the government’s health 
scheme. The autism treatment was excluded from coverage because it 
was administered by persons who were not “health care practitioners” 
under the legislation. The claimants alleged that the legislation violated 
their rights under sections 7 and 15 of the Charter. The challenge was 
unsuccessful.  
The claimants argued that their section 15 rights were violated on 
the ground of disability. To succeed, the differential treatment would 
have to engage their disability. Therefore, they described their compara-
tor group as “non-disabled children and their parents, as well as adult 
persons with mental illness.”86 The Court acknowledged that the choice 
of comparator group was crucial. In its analysis, as in Hodge, the Court 
disagreed with both of the comparator groups selected by the claimants 
and, instead, opted for its own complex formulation: 
I conclude that the appropriate comparator for the petitioners is a non-
disabled person or a person suffering a disability other than a mental 
disability (here autism) seeking or receiving funding for a non-core 
therapy important for his or her present and future health, which is 
emergent and only recently becoming recognized as medically 
required.87 
Clearly, in both Hodge and Auton, the Court required that it have an 
intrusive role in comparator selection. A court has an obligation (or 
“duty,” as expressed by Binnie J. in Hodge) to intervene because the 
decision regarding the comparator is elevated to an issue of law subject 
to the standard of correctness. 
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As with most aspects of the section 15(1) analysis, in Law the Court 
first laid out a comprehensive framework for the proper selection of 
comparator groups. There, Iacobucci J. found that the claimant’s subjec-
tive perspective was essential to this branch of the section 15(1) test: 
 The determination of the appropriate comparator, and the 
evaluation of the contextual factors which determine whether 
legislation has the effect of demeaning a claimant’s dignity must be 
conducted from the perspective of the claimant.88 
This mandatory language supported the Court of Appeal’s approach 
in Hodge, requiring it to respect the subjective perspective of the claim-
ant in comparator selection. Accordingly, this respect for the subjective 
perspective of the claimant led the Court in Law to imply, accordingly, 
that judicial modification of selection would be rare: 
It is the claimant who generally chooses the person, group, or groups 
with whom he or she wishes to be compared for the purpose of the 
discrimination inquiry, thus setting the parameters of the alleged 
differential treatment that he or she wishes to challenge. However, the 
claimant’s characterization of the comparison may not always be 
sufficient. It may be that the differential treatment is not between the 
groups identified by the claimant, but rather between other groups. 
Clearly a court cannot, ex proprio motu, evaluate a ground of 
discrimination not pleaded by the parties and in relation to which no 
evidence has been adduced: see Symes, supra, at p. 762. However, 
within the scope of the ground or grounds pleaded, I would not close 
the door on the power of a court to refine the comparison presented by 
the claimant where warranted.89  
This passage suggests two points. First, while the Court does not 
rule out the possibility of judicial involvement in the comparator selec-
tion process, the language indicates the exception, rather than the rule. 
The idea the Court would not “close the door” is far from Binnie J.’s 
suggestion in Hodge that the Court has an obligation to intervene in 
every section 15(1) case. Second, the quote implies that intervention in 
the comparator selection process, if necessary, should be minimal. That 
is, the court should intervene only to “refine” the comparator group 
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selected by the applicant, rather than redefine it completely. This is 
more consistent with a deferential approach pronounced in Law, requir-
ing an analysis from the claimant’s subjective perspective. 
Clearly, the Supreme Court’s cautious approach to judicial com-
parator selection has shifted dramatically since Law, although some 
incremental steps towards this result were evident before. To present 
Hodge and Auton as a paradigmatic shift ignores some of the more 
gradual changes in the law on comparator selection that have occurred 
since Law. In 2000, in Granovsky90 as in Hodge, the claimant challenged 
provisions of the Canada Pension Plan, but on the enumerated ground of 
disability. In finding that the claim failed, Binnie J. altered the cautious 
approach to judicial comparator selection in Law: 
 The appellant contends that he ought to be compared to an 
ordinary member of the work force who was able-bodied during the 
contribution period because the appellant was being required to satisfy 
the level of contribution expected of an ordinary member of the work 
force with insufficient regard for periods of temporary disability. 
However, while a s. 15 complainant is given considerable scope to 
identify the appropriate group for comparison, “the claimant’s 
characterization of the comparison may not always be sufficient. It 
may be that the differential treatment is not between the groups 
identified by the claimant, but rather between other groups” (Law, 
supra, at para. 58).91  
At the same time, Granovsky did not represent a radical shift from 
the approach in Law. As Binnie J. indicates in the passage above, claim-
ants are given “considerable scope” or wide latitude in their comparator 
selection. The Court indicates that deference is still owed to the claim-
ant’s perspective in choosing comparators. The claimant’s choice may 
not always be sufficient but it doesn’t result in an error of law. 
The earlier deferential approach was grounded in the core idea that 
the subjective experience and perspective of the claimant is central to 
understanding the effect of discrimination on dignity.92 In the cases just 
examined, as well as in Canadian Foundation, the Court shifted away 
from the subjective and deferential approach. This shift away from a 
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model that emphasizes subjectivism is additional confirmation of a more 
communitarian approach.  
2.  The Move Away From the Subjective Perspective in the Dignity 
Test 
The Supreme Court has changed its previous emphasis on the sub-
jective perspective in a further respect. Under Law, in determining 
whether the claimant has established a violation of his or her human 
dignity, the proper point of view is that of the reasonable person, in 
circumstances similar to those of the claimant, who considers all contex-
tual factors relevant to the claim.93 In Canadian Foundation, the Court 
did not apply this test and removed the subjective perspective of the 
claimant children: 
The test is whether a reasonable person possessing the claimant’s 
attributes and in the claimant’s circumstances would conclude that the 
law marginalizes the claimant or treats her as less worthy on the basis 
of irrelevant characteristics: Law, supra. Applied to a child claimant, 
this test may well confront us with the fiction of the reasonable, fully 
apprised preschool-aged child. The best we can do is to adopt the 
perspective of the reasonable person acting on behalf of a child, who 
seriously considers and values the child’s views and developmental 
needs. 94 
Though the Court stated that this approach in no way “minimizes 
the subjective component” of the dignity test, it is hard to see how this 
modification does not impair the subjective analysis in important ways. 
Is the Court itself not comprised of the “reasonable persons” who must 
“seriously consider and value” the views of the child, to adjudicate the 
matter properly? Perhaps this new approach to the dignity test is simply 
a more nuanced way of adjudicating from an objective perspective. 
Whatever the merits of these concerns, the modification of the dignity 
test in Canadian Foundation is illustrative of the same communitarian 
theme — a movement away from relying upon the subjective perspec-
tive of claimants in adjudicating equality claims. 
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VI. TOWARDS A COHESIVE COMMUNITY 
The Same-Sex Marriage Reference was poised to test all facets of 
the Supreme Court’s approach to section 15, including whether the 
traditional, opposite-sex definition of marriage — actually the institu-
tion of marriage itself — was discriminatory and violated section 15. 
However, the case-of-the-year resulted in the disappointment-of-the-
year in respect of section 15 equality claims. The Court not only dis-
missed, quite abruptly, one section 15 argument by interveners on the 
constitutionality of the newly proposed definition of marriage,95 but also 
declined to answer the fourth question as to whether the traditional defi-
nition of marriage was consistent with the Charter.96 The missed oppor-
tunity is regrettable from the perspective of the legal and academic 
community, which would have benefited from the Court’s direction on 
section 15 in a case involving layers of communities and social relation-
ships within the broadest idea of community. 
Despite the disappointments, the decision in the Same Sex Marriage 
Reference reveals at least one communitarian theme with respect to 
substantive equality. At first blush, the Same-Sex Marriage Reference 
and the various Court of Appeal rulings on the constitutionality of the 
traditional definition of marriage,97 all appear to involve the classic clash 
between individual rights and traditional community values. To begin, 
as noted by Carl Stychin, opposition to same-sex marriage rights has 
traditionally invoked communitarian discourse: 
[W]e consistently find opposition to cosmopolitan claims to human 
justice firmly grounded in a communitarian language that speaks to the 
preservation of a particular community’s “way of life,” tradition, and 
often, national or local culture.98  
In this vein, at the Supreme Court, interveners argued that the 
recognition of same-sex marriage would marginalize and discriminate 
                                                                                                                                
95  Same Sex Marriage Reference, [2004] S.C.J. No. 75, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698, at para. 45. 
96  Same Sex Marriage Reference, id., at paras. 61-72. 
97  Halpern v. Canada (Attorney General), [2003] O.J. No. 2268, 65 O.R. (3d) 161 (C.A.) 
[hereinafter “Halpern CA”]; Catholic Civil Rights League v. Hendricks et al., [2004] Q.J. No. 2593, 
238 D.L.R. (4th) 577 (C.A.); EGALE Canada Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), (2003), 238 
D.L.R. (4th) 577 (B.C.C.A.).  
98  Stychin, “Same-Sex Sexualities and the Globalization of Human Rights Discourse” 
(2004) 49 McGill L.J. 951, at 955. 
(2005), 29 S.C.L.R. (2d) The Evolving Approach to Section 15(1) 165 
 
against religious groups whose belief systems required them to adhere to 
the traditional definition of marriage.99 
On a more nuanced analysis, although the decision in the Same Sex 
Marriage Reference was exceptionally brief on the equality analysis, it 
could be interpreted as a recognition of a communitarian conception of 
societal interests. As noted, a key communitarian theme is to understand 
individuals, not in isolation or in opposition to other members of the 
community, but rather, as developing within a web of cohesive social 
and moral relationships. Thus, the proper understanding of community 
is not one in which isolated, categorized persons holding individual 
values and interests constantly clash with competing interests and values 
of other individuals. In addressing the argument that the equality rights 
of religious groups or opposite-sex couples were violated by Parlia-
ment’s recognition of same-sex marriage, the Court essentially deployed 
a distinctly communitarian notion of societal interests: 
The mere recognition of the equality rights of one group cannot, in 
itself, constitute a violation of the rights of another. The promotion of 
Charter rights and values enriches our society as a whole and the 
furtherance of those rights cannot undermine the very principles the 
Charter was meant to foster.100 
In other words, the argument that promoting certain individual in-
terests inevitably leads to clashes with other community interests is a 
notion of society composed of individualized and competing rights 
holders. This is not a communitarian conception of society. Rather, as 
the Court points out, the promotion of certain goals — in this case equal 
concern — ought to be understood as a community interest, one that 
promotes overall cohesion and community values “as a whole.” Indeed, 
as Kymlicka notes, it has long been the view of communitarians that 
shared goals are important to the overall cohesion of a community: 
[Communitarians] Sandel and Taylor say that there are shared ends 
that can serve as the basis for a politics of the common good which 
will be legitimate for all groups in society.101 
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Promoting equal concern for citizens as an overall community goal 
makes sense in these circumstances. After all, the Court in Same Sex 
Marriage Reference was hearing a reference by the government for the 
benefit of Parliament, the institution that represents the interests of the 
Canadian community, which proposed the change to the definition of 
marriage through its draft legislation.  
VII. LINGERING CONCERNS AND THE ROAD AHEAD 
We have suggested that in the past year, the Supreme Court has em-
barked on a new approach to section 15 that gives effect to important 
communitarian themes. To begin with, by approaching the “needs” of 
the child claimants in Canadian Foundation as inherently tied to their 
essential social relationships, the Court has followed the communitarian 
theme that a person should be understood not in individualistic terms, 
but as embedded within a broader social environment and community. 
This same communitarian theme is evident in NAPE where the Court, 
for the first time, linked the economic interests of the community with 
the interests and values of the individual. The Court’s decisions in 
Hodge and Auton also gave effect to another communitarian theme — a 
shift away from the emphasis on a subjective approach to individual 
interests and values — by diminished deference to the claimants’ selec-
tion of comparators. The same theme also appeared in Canadian Foun-
dation, where the Court removed subjectivity from the “reasonableness” 
dignity test. Finally, the Court in Same Sex Marriage Reference ap-
peared to recognize a communitarian concept of societal interests and 
goals. 
The communitarian approach to equality has clear benefits. It pro-
vides a more contextual and concrete understanding of claimants. They 
are viewed less as isolated or subjective individuals, but rather as what 
they are: members of the real and broader community to which their 
interests and values are inherently tied. The Court’s recognition of the 
importance of economic interests of the broader community is also a 
welcome development, given the centrality of such concerns for modern 
democratic governments. In the past, the Court has dismissed such in-
terests or concerns as irrelevant. 
At the same time, however, some lingering concerns about these 
developments exist. While the communitarian approach has benefits, the 
Court ought to guard against departing too far from individualistic no-
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tions of equality rights. As indicated at the outset, the Court has been 
concerned with finding the proper balance between the individual rights 
found in section 15 and the corresponding interests recognized in sec-
tion 1. After all, the Charter purports to protect “individual rights” rather 
than community interests. 
Also, logistical concerns stem from the Court’s change in approach 
to comparator selection and the dignity test. First, the complete removal 
of the “subjective component” from the dignity test in Canadian Foun-
dation may be difficult to justify, given that “human dignity” itself relies 
on subjective notions of equality.102 The Court removed the “subjective 
component” of the dignity test in Canadian Foundation on the basis that 
it was too difficult to determine what “reasonable children” would feel 
in a given circumstance. This rationale could be applied similarly in 
future challenges by other vulnerable groups. For example, as Sanjeev 
Anand points out, it would be equally difficult for the Court to reason 
from the perspective of severely mentally or physically disabled claim-
ants, justifying the use of the same modified dignity test.103 This “pater-
nalistic” approach could open the Court to accusations that it is ignoring 
“significant concerns” of claimants.104 
Second, comparator selection could prove a tricky hurdle for claim-
ants to overcome in the future. After Hodge and Auton, it is quite appar-
ent that a court can, as happened in those cases, completely disregard 
any comparator groups relied on by the claimant. With no deference 
remaining, it would be inadvisable for a claimant to assume that his or 
her comparator selection is correct. The unfortunate result of this cir-
cumstance is that claimants bear a difficult burden to establish the prop-
er evidentiary record to establish their claim. If a trial or appeal court 
disregards a claimant’s comparator group selection in its section 15 
analysis, the claimant’s evidentiary record could be insufficient, causing 
the equality claim to fail.  
Third, with less deference shown by the Court to the subjective per-
spective of claimants, courts have a greater measure of judicial discre-
tion in characterizing the claim at each stage of the Law analysis. With 
greater judicial discretion comes the risk of results-driven decisions, or 
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at least the appearance of judicial pre-determination of results. Hodge 
and Auton provide cases in point. Once the Court characterized the 
situations of the claimants as comparable to different comparator 
groups, which bore no distinction from the claimants, the claimants’ 
results were determined and the cases collapsed on themselves. Yet, the 
full explanations of the changes in comparator groups were very brief.105 
In this regard, it is important for the Court to provide robust analyses 
and thorough justifications to assist other litigants in the proper for-
mation of their claims and corresponding records if valid claims of 
equality breaches are to succeed. 
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